もう一つは、トランプ政権特有の「アメリカ・ファースト」の色眼鏡を通して見た時、これまでに説明したような、対北軍事オプションを実行した場合の問題点がクリアされてしまう可能性がある、ということだ。端的に言えば、同盟国である韓国や日本に被害が出ようとも、米本土を核の脅威から守ることを優先すべき、という発想である。 続きを読む アメリカ・ファーストと対北朝鮮軍事オプション⑤～アメリカ・ファーストが軍事オプションの背中を押す？
カテゴリー別アーカイブ: 安全保障
アメリカ・ファーストと対北朝鮮軍事オプション④～トランプ政権と重なる北朝鮮攻撃の「最後の機会」
北朝鮮による核・ミサイルの開発・配備をやめさせようとし軍事オプションを検討すれば、米辱政府は以上のような厳しい現実に必ず直面する。トランプ政権になってもそのあたりの事情は何一つ変わらない。常識的に考えれば、トランプ大統領もこれまでの大統領と同じく、軍事オプションには踏み切れないだろう。だがこの政権については、北朝鮮の突きつける現実を過去の政権とは違ったレンズを通して眺めることになるかもしれない、という要素を考える必要がある。 続きを読む アメリカ・ファーストと対北朝鮮軍事オプション④～トランプ政権と重なる北朝鮮攻撃の「最後の機会」
アメリカ・ファーストと対北朝鮮軍事オプション③～どこを攻撃するというのか？
米国が軍事オプションを控える中、北朝鮮は核・ミサイル開発を営々と続けてきた。その結果、北朝鮮のミサイル能力は米国が先制攻撃するには「進化しすぎた段階」に入り、米国が軍事オプションに踏み切る際のハードルを一段と引き上げている。 続きを読む アメリカ・ファーストと対北朝鮮軍事オプション③～どこを攻撃するというのか？
アメリカ・ファーストと対北朝鮮軍事オプション②～ソウルを「人質」にとられている
北朝鮮の核開発を止めるための軍事オプションを検討するのはトランプ政権が初めてではない。1994年、北朝鮮は寧辺にある原子炉から核燃料棒を取り出して核兵器開発を大きく進めようとしていた。これに対し、クリントン政権は北朝鮮の核施設に対する軍事攻撃を真剣に検討した。 続きを読む アメリカ・ファーストと対北朝鮮軍事オプション②～ソウルを「人質」にとられている
アメリカ・ファーストと対北朝鮮軍事オプション①～北朝鮮攻撃の誘惑
トランプ政権は現在、北朝鮮政策の見直し作業を行っており、そこでは軍事オプションも検討の俎上に乗っているという。従来の常識で考えれば、米国政府が軍事オプションを採用することはありえない。しかし、トランプが「アメリカ・ファースト」の理念に心底忠実であれば、北朝鮮の核施設等に対する先制攻撃オプションが現実のものとなる可能性も（極めて困難な決定だが）完全にゼロではない。その場合、日本も人的・物的な被害を受けるとともに、先の大戦以降初めてとなる「戦争」に踏み切ることも覚悟しなければならなくなる。 続きを読む アメリカ・ファーストと対北朝鮮軍事オプション①～北朝鮮攻撃の誘惑
Donald Trump and Shinzo Abe’s “Departure from the Postwar Regime”
Mr. Donald Trump will take office as the 45th President of the United States later today. As I ceased to update my blog from personal reasons after he won the election on November 9, I should publish at this timing what I think about Japan and the United States under President Trump.
In the field of international commerce, Trump’s intension to withdraw from already signed Tran-Pacific Partnership agreement is certainly a blow to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as Japan just ratified it only a month ago. On national security front, however, Abe must be thinking, or will soon start thinking, to take advantage of the advent of President Trump for realizing his dream of “departure from the postwar regime.” In other words, Abe potentially has an incentive to “deal” with the new president of the United States.
続きを読む Donald Trump and Shinzo Abe’s “Departure from the Postwar Regime”
The Japan-Russo Northern Territories Negotiation: II. Weak Intervention by the United States
Second, the hindrance to the Japan-Russo negotiation from the United States has been weak this time, and Abe seems to be insensitive to it. Recall the Japan-Soviet negotiation in the mid-1950s under Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama. The necessity to improve the relationship with the Soviet Union as it vetoed Japan’s membership in the United Nations mainly drove the government of Japan. Then U.S. government intervened strongly against it.
Tokyo wanted to realize the return of four islands and conclude a Peace Treaty with Moscow. But the State Department was alarmed. Drawing a border between Japan and the Soviet Union in the treaty meant that Japan admitted Russian sovereignty over the rest of Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, which the United States never admitted. At the height of Cold War, any gain for Moscow was regarded as a loss for Washington. Americans were worried about the domino effects on the issues such as the status of Taiwan and the approval of the People’s Republic of China. The State Department was also nervous if the solution of the Northern Territories may ignite an irredentism in Japan over Okinawa and Ogasawara Islands.
In the process of the negotiation, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu thought that the GOJ should compromise with the return of two islands (Shikotan and Habomais), and had better conclude a peace treaty. In the summer of 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met Shigemitsu in London and delivered a warning known as “intimidation by Dulles.” He said that the United States will forever stay in Okinawa if the Japanese government admits the Soviet Union full sovereignty over the (rest of) Kuril Islands. On September 9, Dulles told Shigemitsu that the U.S. government considered the four islands, not the two, should be returned to Japan. It was not the advice for the sake of Japan. The State Department reached the conclusion after being convinced that Etorofu/Itrup and Kunashiri/Kunashir were too important for the Soviet Union to give up from the military points of views. In effect, it was the advice to prohibit Japan’s concession.
Prime Minister Hatoyama finally visited Moscow and signed a Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration on October 19, 1956. As a result, Japan and the Soviet Union resumed diplomatic relations. Moscow agreed to transfer Shikotan and Habomais to Japan after concluding the Peace Treaty. Nothing was mentioned about Etorofu/Itrup and Kunashiri/Kunashir. No borderline was drawn between the two countries and two islands of Shikotan and Habomais have never been returned to Japan because the treaty has not ever concluded.
The relationship between the United States and Russia has been deteriorated for the last decade, especially after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.The Obama administration is not very happy with Abe’s initiative to make a big deal with Putin. But the U.S. administration today is not so serious as to intimidate Japan. The Cold War is over, and current threat from Russia is no more vital.
For his part, Abe does not seem to care much about Washington’s uneasiness. The nature of so called “New Cold War” is bilateral, not global. Japan does not really see material loss if it neglects American anxiety.
Personal character of Abe also facilitates a deviation from the United States. He emphasizes the importance of Japan-U.S. alliance in the context of dealing the threat from China and North Korea. But Abe is fundamentally a nationalist. He visited the Yasukuni Shrine on December 26, 2013, causing to lose face of Vice President Joe Biden. As for the matters related to Russia, Abe has been surprisingly stubborn. When the U.S. president was trying to launch a military strike on Syria in order to punish its use of chemical weapons in the late summer of 2013, he avoided committing himself to support Obama, tacitly siding with Putin. Abe’s persistence in the resolution of the Northern Territories issues was basically intact even when Russia annexed Crimea. Although the United States and the EU posed sanctions on Russia and urged Japan to follow, the Japanese government responded only nominally.
China Is Crossing A Red Line over the Senkaku Islands: Ⅳ．The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Senkakus
What will the United States do if the Japanese and Chinese coast guards or the two militaries clash over the Senkaku Islands?
Needless to say, the United States and Japan are the allies based on Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The U.S. forces have been stationing in Japan for more than seven decades. The United States has strategic concern over rising China as Beijing has seemingly started challenging the present word order. The U.S. trade in goods with Japan in 2015 amounted to 194 billion dollars. And the United States shares the value of democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law with Japan much more than with China. Then, can we expect the United States to militarily intervene to help Japan? The answer is not simple.
For the United States, China is at least as important as Japan. The U.S. trade in goods with China in 2015 reached 599 billion dollars, tippling that with Japan. Washington needs Beijing’s cooperation in controlling North Korea and other bad guys. China has a veto power as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Despite the Pivot to Asia strategy, Obama administration has had no choice but to continue to give priority on Middle East and/or Russia. Furthermore, Chinese military is too strong to make war with. Even if the U.S. military can finally win—I believe it will—, the casualties and costs will not be comparable to the war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or Taliban.
Officially, the U.S. government has an established view on the Senkaku Islands. That is, the U.S. government admits that article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers all the territories under the administration of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands, while refusing to take a position on final sovereignty on the Senkakus. This basic line was made clear by early 2000s at the latest, after Ambassador Walter Mondale made a confusing comment in 1996 on the applicability of the Security Treaty in case of a possible Japan-China conflict over the Senkakus Islands. The more China increased provocation around the Senkakus, the higher ranking U.S. government officials, including President Barak Obama in April 2014, repeated this line. Recently, the United States added that the Senkakus have been historically administered by Japan and its sovereignty should not be subject to change unilaterally.
The United States will continue to say that the Security Treaty covers the Senkaku Islands in the foreseeable future. Although I am not sure about President Donald Trump, the U.S. has at least four reasons to do so. First is the historical involvement. The United States administered the Senkaku Islands after the World War II, and returned it to Japan in May 1972. Second, if Washington says that the Treaty does not cover the Senkakus, Japan will see little value on the alliance. The United States will lose the most precious ally in Asia with sophisticated military and big economy, as well as the U.S. bases in Japan. Third, if Washington takes ambiguous position on the applicability of the Treaty over the Senkakus, other U.S. allies would think the United States recoils from China. Then the credibility of the U.S. alliance all over the world will be severely damaged. And finally, the change of the current position may send a devastating signal to Beijing that Washington would tolerate China’s taking over the Senkaku Islands. In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson failed to mention Korean Peninsula when he made a speech about the lines of defense, which led Kim Il-Sung to expect that the United States would not intervene even if North Korean military invades south.
Japan has appreciated the U.S. commitment to apply the Security obligation over the Senkakus. But how effective was it to actually deter Chinese provocation? The answer is mixed. On the one hand, Beijing has so far advanced the scope of activities gradually in the East China Sea, without invoking the Treaty obligation for the United States. On the other hand, China has never tried to use force and seemingly avoided material clash with Japan in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands.
Will the announcement of the U.S. Treaty commitment over the Senkakus continue to deter China’s use of force? As I already explained, there are cases where China finally uses force while intending not to. For example, the possibility of a clash between the two coast guards is higher than even, and it may escalate to a military conflict between the SDF and the PLA in the worst scenarios.
Will the United States be obliged to make war with China in order to defend Japan and the Senkakus, then? I would like to say yes from the standpoint of Japan. But objectively speaking, the interpretation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will be heavily influenced by the political calculation of the U.S. government.